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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of firm owners and coworkers on hiring patterns and
wages. Firstly, I explore the potential mechanisms generating their interrelation. Using a
search model where social networks reduce search frictions, I develop the theoretical impli-
cations of social ties between owners and workers for individual labor market outcomes. In
the model, wages are derived endogenously as a function of the efficiency of the social ties of
current employees. Firms decide whether to fill their vacancies by posting their offers or by
using their current workers’ connections. As a result, individuals with a more efficient con-
nection tend to receive higher wages. These findings highlight the potential importance of
social connections and social capital for understanding employment opportunities and wage
differentials. Secondly,using a unique matched sample from an employer-employee admin-
istrative database and a survey of characteristics of small firm owners, I analyze the impact
of the birthplace of employers and individual coworkers (native versus immigrant) on firm
hiring patterns and average log wages. First, I explore the effect of owner type on the com-
position of new hires. The results show that firms with immigrant owners are more likely to
hire immigrant workers. Moreover, among immigrant owners, this prevalence is especially
strong for Hispanic and Asian workers. I also find that the probability that a new hire is a na-
tive, non-Hispanic white or black is higher for native firms. Second, I estimate the impact of
owners and coworkers place of birth on wage differentials across worker types, controlling
for workers’ human capital. The results illustrate that much of the difference between the
log annual wage of immigrants and natives comes from immigrants’ propensity to work in
non-native owned firms, which pay the lowest average wages. Interestingly, though, native
workers holding a job in immigrant firms are paid less than immigrant workers. The paper
concludes by discussing the extent to which the empirical findings can account for the model.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the effect of the birthplace of firm owners and coworkers on hiring patterns
and wages. As of 2007, immigrant workers represented 15% of the U.S. population. The impact
of large inflows of immigrants and their assimilation into the host economy has been a primary
area of study in the labor literature. How such large flows of workers are incorporated into the
labor market and interact with various businesses and workers is of special interest. The role
of business owners in the patterns of hires and earnings in the labor market has played an im-
portant role in this literature. In particular, some studies have found that the type of manager
recruiting new workers is a determinant of the firm’s workforce composition. For instance, Car-
rington and Troske [1995] and Giuliano and Ransom [2008] have found that females and blacks
are disproportionatly employed by female and black supervisors respectively. Meanwhile, Stoll
et al. [2004] found that black businesses receive more applications from black workers and em-
ploy more black workers than other businesses.
This paper explores the potential mechanisms explaining the interconnection between owner’s
and coworkers’ characteristics and workers’ hiring patterns and wages. Recent work has used
the idea of networks in the labor market to explain labor market inequalities as a function of
differential social capital (social resources, network structures, network resources). Minority in-
dividuals are generally connected to other minority-group workers who cannot provide them
with the opportunity to change their employment outcomes. Hispanics and blacks are disad-
vantaged because they are likely to match with same-kind job contacts, and end up working in
lower wage workplaces where other Hispanics and blacks work (Elliot [2001]). Following this
thought stream, I use a search model where social networks reduce search frictions to develop
the theoretical implications of social ties between owners and workers for individual labor out-
comes. The model helps provide insights into what assumptions would be necessary to account
for the qualitative patterns in the empirical analysis. In the model, wages are derived endoge-
nously as a function of the efficiency of the social ties of current employees. Firms can fill their
vacancies either by posting offers or by using their current workers’ connections. As a result,
individuals with better connections tend to have higher wages. Two forces drive that result.
First, current workers provide a costless recruitment mechanism to the firm. Second, workers
will produce more new hires in the future and for those unemployed, a better social connection
would result in more job offers.
Using a unique matched sample from an employer-employee administrative database and
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a survey of characteristics of small-firm owners, this study analyzes the impact of the type of
employers and individual coworkers (natives versus immigrants, or ethnic groups) on firm hir-
ing patterns and workers’ average log wages. Firm types are defined by the type of owner
(immigrant-owned versus native-owned), while ‘’coworker” refers to the fraction of same-kind
fellow workers holding a job in the same firm. The share of immigrant coworkers in the firm is
called the coworker index.1 This index intends to capture, in a general way, the effect of coworkers
in the establishment’s dynamics. The particularity of the index is that we are able to account for
all existing coworkers, including their characteristics, before an individual is hired. We connect
owner and firm characteristics (place of birth, size and industry) with workers’ characteristics
(wage, age, education, and place of birth) to test different assumptions about firm hiring pat-
terns and the wage differentials of workers of different types. Given the unique features of the
matched database, the data allows asking whether there exist wage premia associated with being
an immigrant and with working for or with other immigrants.
The type of a new hire can be affected by the type of employer in different ways. First, so-
cial networks, segregated by race or similar background, could be used by job seekers and by
employers when looking for new candidates. Ethnic communities provide a network for immi-
grant entrepreneurs to find workers, to sell ethnic goods, and to obtain credit. Second, match-
ing productivity generated by employer-employee similarity could motivate owners to employ
same-kind individuals. In certain industries the use of a common language may be important
for productive efficiency. Third, employer tastes might bias them to employ workers of a sim-
ilar kind. Employer discrimination could generate scope for segregation.2 However, coworker
effects could compensate for the presence of employer discrimination. In fact, for all types of
owners the share of similar coworkers increases the probability of being hired in the firm. We
also control for specific characteristics in the firm, such as the fraction of English speakers, to
identify the possible scope for matching productivity. This paper focuses on the importance of
social ties in the process of recruitment when firms use current employees’ social connections
to help find and identify new candidates. However, employers may use this mechanism differ-
ently for different worker types, depending on their ability to take advantage of their workers’
connections. For instance, given their cultural, linguistic, and social backgrounds, immigrant
employers have an advantage, compared to natives, in exploiting their immigrant workers’ so-
cial connections.
1In this Chapter, the expressions firm type and owner type are used to explain that firm’s owners correspond to one
of the following groups: native-only, immigrant-only, and mix owned firms.
2Lang [1986]
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Our results suggest that immigrant owners are three percentage points more likely than na-
tive owners to hire other immigrants, even after controlling for industry, firm size, geographic
concentration of immigrants in the population, population density, and the legal form of orga-
nization of the firm. Looking at ethnic/race groups, immigrant owners (Hispanic/Asian owned
firms) are 3 to 4 percentage points more likely than native owners (white and black owned firms)
to hire Asians and Hispanics versus blacks and whites. Both, native and immigrant owners, hire
white non-Hispanic workers, but native owners have a higher probability of having white work-
ers as new hires. These results are based on both linear probability models and a multinomial
logit specification that accounts for the simultaneity of choosing from different types of workers.
Among our strongest findings are the existence of a persistent pattern of hiring similar types
and the smaller effect of the share of dissimilar coworkers on the likelihood of hiring a particular
individual. For instance, the share of similar coworkers at the time of recruitment increases
the probability of hiring a worker of a type by around 60%. The probability is higher when
the owner is similar to the new hired. Additionally, this probability is different whether the
employer is immigrant versus native. Immigrant businesses show higher chances of hiring a
new immigrant, Hispanic or Asian compared to native businesses, even after looking whether
they have similar workforce distribution at the time of a new recruitment.
To study the wages of employees, one must understand the role of employers in wage-
setting, which necessitates gathering wage data by employer and having detailed information
about the employer. Immigrant workers tend to have lower average wages than native workers.
Many authors have used a human capital approach to explain that wage gap and have found that
skill accounts for almost two thirds of the wage difference between Hispanics and white Non-
Hispanics.3 Meanwhile, the residual unexplained wage gap has traditionally been used to claim
the existence of racial/ethnic discrimination in the labor market. Other authors have found that
industry wage-differentials are to a very large extent explained by the characteristics of workers
and the contribution of industry to wage setting is much smaller after looking at both person
and that industry effects.4 However, these studies don’t rule out a significant impact of firm-
level effects on wage formation.5 The results in this paper suggest that much of the difference
between the log annual wages of immigrants and natives comes from immigrants’ propensity to
work in non-native owned firms, which pay the lowest average log annual wages. Interestingly,
3Borjas [1994], Trejo [1997], Chiswick [1978], Borjas [2003] among others.
4Abowd et al. [1999]
5These authors obtained that the average of the difference in wages paid to an identical worker employed at two
different firms in France was 20%-30%.
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though, native workers holding a job in immigrant firms are paid less than immigrant workers.
After controlling for typical human capital variables, full-time immigrant workers earn about
8% less than native workers ($3,293 less each year). When working for native employers this
difference increases to 11%. Meanwhile, immigrant workers earn 10% more than native workers
in immigrant owned firms ($4,398 more each year).
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has analyzed the link between employer
and coworkers’ birthplaces and employees’ employment opportunities and wages in a large set
of industries and geographic locations. This research provides initial steps on that branch of
analysis. These findings suggest that social connections and social capital may be important for
understanding employment opportunities and wage differentials.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous work on the
relation between workers and types of firms, ethnic economies and ’ethnic matching’ between
supervisors and employees, the usage of networks, and network effects on hiring procedures and
workers’ wages. It also discusses the importance of analyzing small businesses when looking at
the impact of immigration. 3 develops a theoretical framework to analyze the matching process
between heterogeneous workers and firms by introducing the efficiency of current workers’ so-
cial ties as a form of social network. Section 5 examines the data and presents basic descriptive
statistics on owners’ and workers’ characteristics. Next, section 6 presents preliminary informa-
tion on workers’ average earnings by worker type and by different levels of coworker shares.
Section 7 is divided in two sections. The first part analyzes whether the type of employer and
coworker characteristics affect the composition of new hires in firms. The second part evaluates
the impact of firm owner type on employees’ log annual earnings controlling for worker human
capital. Section Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Because no single theory exists to explain the effect of firm owners and coworkers on hiring
patterns and wages, I draw on the literature of several related fields to motivate my hypotheses
on the subject. Those literatures include ethnic economy theories dealing with ethnic/immigrant
concentration, theories of firm wage differentials and hiring procedures, and network theories.
Immigrants tend to work in low-wage/low-productivity firms, low-pay occupations, and
in firms with a high percentage of immigrant workers.6 Some researchers have found occupa-
tional and ethnic coworker concentration in the United States (Andersson et al. [2007], Patel and
6Borjas [1994], Borjas [2003], Andersson et al. [2007], and Andersson et al. [2008].
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Vella [2007], and Light [2006]) and in other countries (Barr and Oduro [2000] and Andersson and
Wadensjó [2001]). The literature has attempted to explain workers’ concentration by skill, race,
and sex.7 Hellerstein and Neumark [2007] analyzed ethnic segregation in the United States and
found a substantial degree of segregation in the workplace. They claim that even though work-
place segregation partially results from residential segregation (spatial mismatch explanation) and
from ethnically correlated skills, there seem to be other mechanisms that suggest the presence of
immigrant social connection effects. In an extensive analysis of racial and ethnic segregation across
U.S. workplaces, they found that a large degree of segregation remains even after accounting
for metropolitan areas, and that very little of this segregation can be explained by observed dif-
ferences in education and occupations. Language, however, seems to be a significant factor for
immigrant segregation. Lang [1986]’s theory provides an explanation for worker segregation
by language groups. When there are transaction costs associated with employees of different
language groups working together, there is scope for segregation. Employers of each language
group have incentives to fully segregate to avoid the cost of needing employees who can be the
bridge between different language groups.
Despite findings on immigrant concentration at different levels, we cannot be sure that im-
migrants are more likely to work for immigrant bosses and that such a pattern would affect indi-
viduals’ labor market outcomes. There is no evidence that immigrant businesses are distributed
differently across industries, sizes, or skills, than native businesses.
A recent group of studies analyzes the matching process between managers and workers
by racial group. Giuliano et al. [2006] found a significant effect of race and ethnicity on hiring
procedures. For example, in locations with large Hispanic populations, Hispanic managers tend
to hire more Hispanics and fewer whites than white non-Hispanic managers. In a more recent
analysis, Giuliano and Ransom [2008], looks at the effect of manager ethnicity on hires, separa-
tions and promotions across different occupations in a U.S. retail firm. Whites were more likely
to leave stores where managers were Hispanics than when they were white. Their work is very
relevant, however they only focus on the effect of the manager race on the hiring decisions. Their
studies do not consider the coworker effect. That is, they don’t study the effect of the fraction of
similar coworkers holding a job in the firm when a new worker is hired. This coworker effect
can also differ across all types of owners. They do not consider at the effect of the firm workforce
composition and the possible effects of coworker on new hires.
There has not yet been a connection established between owner’s nativity and the type of
7Kremer and Maskin [1996], Hellerstein and Neumark [2003].
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workers employed at a firm and the employee earnings. Nevertheless, the literature treats mo-
tivations for supervisor-employee matching. First, firm owners could have preferences for em-
ploying individuals of their own type or with the same background. Second, the types of goods
offered by immigrant firms may differ from those offered by native firms. In immigrant that
specialize in producing ethnic goods, immigrant workers have a comparative advantage over
native workers in these firms. The differences between products can result in different worker
composition.8 However, none of these reasons have obvious predictions on workers’ earnings.
That an employer has a preference for a certain group does not necessarily imply higher wages
for that group. The distribution of workers and employers in the market also affects the labor
market equilibrium.
In sociology literature, there have been a limited number of studies that provide some in-
sights on the tendency of immigrants to work for immigrant firms. For instance, in Los Angeles,
in 1989, 30 percent of employed Koreans held jobs in firms owned by fellow Koreans even though
Koreans composed only one percent of the Los Angeles County population.9 According to Car-
denas and Hansen [1988], during the 1980s, Mexican immigrant employers were most likely to
hire Mexican, whether legal or undocumented, and favorably evaluate their quality. Porter and
Wilson [1980] find two relevant patterns in the Cuban immigration to Miami during the 1960s.
First, Cubans worked with other Cubans. Second, almost one-third of the Cubans worked for
Cuban employers. The phenomenon of immigrants hiring immigrants is not limited to coethnic
relationships between employees and employers. Other researchres have found that employers
from one immigrant group often hire workers from other ethno/racial groups.10 In Los Angeles,
during the nineties, 51% of the garment factories were owned by Asians with most of their em-
ployees being Hispanics. Ethnic networks alone cannot expand the supply of coethnic-accessible
jobs. Generally, the number of jobs offererd by ethnic-specific owned firms is not equal to the
number of possible candidates from the same ethnic group in the local communitiy. Business
leaders from ethnic groups whose rates of entrepreneurship are higher than other groups, find
it increasingly difficult to limit hiring to members of their own groups. Ethnic crossover can
expand the economic opportunities provided by immigrant-owned business. Immigrant work-
ers often join networks that generally cross ethnic boundaries. Using the Garment Industry in
Los Angeles as an example, Light [2006] analyzes immigrant ownership economies consisting of
immigrant employers plus their immigrant but not coethnic employees. He finds that this type
8Andersson and Wadensjó [2001]
9Min [1989].
10Massey [1999], Massey et al. [1987].
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of economy explains part of the garment industry’s growth during early 1990s in Los Angeles.
The cited studies have been limited to small samples from a particular geographic areas and
specific groups of firms and immigrants. Most of them also focus on a particular period of time,
with a cross-sectional view of the distribution of workers and firms. Seemingly, their analyses
intended not to look beyond the segregation aspect and to analyze the possible causes and con-
sequences of those patterns. Unlike previous studies, this paper uses a representative group
of areas, industries and workers, and it analyzes the flow of hiring and the effect of employer-
employee type matches on wages. The underlying hypothesis in the analysis is that workers and
employers made different use of their social connections in the market, which led to a particular
hiring pattern by each firm type.
On wage effects, previous research has suggested that much of the unexplained variation in
wages among employees is linked to characteristics of their firms, such as size and industry.11
Not only individual characteristics explain wage differentials between immigrants and natives,
but potentially so do other characteristics, such as the birthplace or ethnicity of employers and
coworkers. Unfortunately, most wage databases come from household surveys of individuals
who earn wages (Decennial Census and CPS), rather than from establishment surveys of wage-
paying employers; they provide little employer-specific information, except for industry and, in
some cases, firm size.
3 An Exploratory Model
3.1 Setup
In this section I explore the potential mechanisms underlying the results of the previous section.
Using a search model where social networks reduce search frictions, I develop the theoretical
implications of social ties between owners and workers for individual labor outcomes. In the
model, wages are derived endogenously as a function of the efficiency of the social ties of cur-
rent employees. Firms can choose to fill their vacancies either by posting offers or by using
their current workers’ connections. As a result, individuals with better connections have higher
wages. Individual with more ties would find more candidates for the firm, but he would have
more opportunities when he becomes unemployed. The model intends to illustrate the match-
ing process between workers and businesses incorporating the existence of networks and firm’s
choice of hiring procedure. A firm chooses its recruitment policies (formal vs. informal) when
11[Groshen, 1990, 1991a,b], Abowd et al. [1999], Abowd et al. [2004] among others.
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filling a particular vacancy, considering the capacity of their employees to find candidates for
the position.
There has been previous theoretical work analyzing the impact of firm and coworker types
on the information structure of job finding and the link between job search, job matching and
social networks. Holzer [1987] is the first theoretical discussion of firms’ hiring procedures. He
proposes a model in which the firm maximizes expected profit considering recruitment costs and
worker’s expected productivity. However, no implications for wages were analyzed. Networks
may reduce costs and the uncertainty about workers’ productivity (Holzer [1987], and Simon
and Wagner [1992]). Since screening workers, negotiating wages, supervising, and enforcing
contracts are all part of the administrative costs of a firm12, firm owners may improve efficiency
by using network connections available to workers with similar social backgrounds. That is,
information networks may work better within groups (ethnic/race of employers and employees)
than between them. 13
A second group of studies consider job information networks as exogenous and investi-
gate the impact of networks on wages ([Montgomery, 1991, 1992], and Mortensen and Vish-
wanath[1994]). In these models, the equilibrium wage distribution increases with the probabil-
ity that an offer comes from a contact. Montgomery further evaluates the link between wages
and the strength of social ties (strong versus weak). Even though more recent studies have ex-
plicitly modeled the structure of networks to analyze the effect of network dynamics on wages
and unemployment [Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004, 2007], the assumption of an exogenous
job information network is still very useful to analyze wage and vacancy outcomes. Models
with detailed specifications of network topology treat labor markets as a black box. There is ex
ante wage dispersion and an exogenous arrival rate of job offers. It is assumed that wages are
function of the network size and that individuals randomly choose the number of social contacts
from the total population of workers.
In this model, I endogenize labor market outcomes (wages and vacancies) but assume an
exogenous job information network14. The aim of this model is to illustrate in a simple way
the effect of social networks on labor outcomes with different firm and worker types to develop
patterns consistent with the findings in the previous section.
12Very relevant for small businesses because of the lack of scale economies
13In this analysis I consider the heterogeneous group of immigrants as an homogeneous group. In the empirical
approach, I also separate groups by their race or ethnicity
14Other models fully describe the topology of the networks. However, in the framework of this paper, trying to
endogenize networks would make it impossible to find a closed form solution. The simplicity of the model presented
here allows us to draw strong implications without losing the relevant characteristics of the process.
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Inspired by Holzer [1987] and Fontaine [2006], I consider a search model that includes firm’s
hiring decisions and the use of current workers’ social ties. I include different types of firms
and multiple networks. A in Fontaine [2006], the matching function is derived from an urn-
ball process.15 This process provides a microfoundation for the matching process and considers
the coordination failure that arises from congestion externalities.16 A underlying assumption
in the model is that the levels of vacancies and unemployment are very high, holding their
ratio (market tightness) constant. In this limiting case, the urn-ball matching function exhibits
constant returns to scale. Wages are a result of bargaining between workers and employers.
There are two types of firms (o) denoted as native-owned (n) and immigrant-owned (f ), and
two types of workers (i) denote as natives (n) and immigrants (f ). The number of each type of
worker is exogenously given by Li, and the number of type i workers among the unemployed is
ui. Workers and firms are risk neutral, live infinitely and have a common discount rate r. There is
free-entry, and δo represents the number of type o firms in steady state. Only unmatched workers
engage in search. Unemployed workers receive a value of leisure b, and workers are separated
from jobs at the exogenous rate s. Jobs are vacant or occupied.
Each existing worker generates applicants for the employer at an exogenous rate ρio, which
depends on worker (i) and employer (o) types. This factor is common to all firms with type
o. Therefore, ρio represents what Fontaine calls network efficiency. Network efficiency can be
considered to be a function both of the number of workers of type i in the firm and their social
ties with same-type unemployed workers, and of the employer o’s ability to use his employees’
(type i) connections. An employee of a given group transfers job offers only to unemployed
workers belonging to the same group. If he doesn’t find an unemployed worker from his group,
the job offer is lost. All types of employed workers produce y. In addition to relying on coworker
referrals, firms can advertise a job vacancy at a cost c. These posted offers are sent randomly the
u unemployed workers. θi represents market tightness for workers of group i. vo is the number
of vacancies posted by firm of type o.
As previously noted, the matching function is derived from an urn-ball process (binomial
15In the typical urn-ball process, there are U unemployed workers and V vacancies. Each unemployed worker
submits an application. These applications are randomly distributed across the V vacancies with the restriction
that any particular worker send at most one application to any particular vacancy. Each vacancy then chooses one
application at random and offers that applicant a job. A worker may get more than one offer. In that case, the worker
accepts one of the offers at random. Urn-ball process introduces a new coordination problem, because there could be
multiple applications of job seekers but only one firm will hire the individual.
16This failure arises when workers apply to some vacancies without knowing where other workers applied, so that
as a result there are multiple applications to some vacancies and zero to others. Therefore, the group of vacancies
without applicants remains unfilled. For more detail refer to Albrecht et al. [2003].
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distribution). However, in this model, unemployed workers are considered the urns and job
offers the balls. Unemployed workers receive offers from two sources: from posted vacancies
and from similar-type current workers in the firm. 1u is the chance that any unemployed worker
receives an offer from a posted vacancy and 1ui is a type-i unemployed worker’s probability of
receiving an offer from social ties to a particular existing worker at the firm. Given the random-
ness of vacancies offered to unemployed workers, the probability that no firms’ offers reach an






ρioLi . With this in mind, we can









where, Ci represents the probability that a unemployed worker receives at least one job offer.
In a labor market in which vacancies and unemployment are arbitrarily large but finite, holding
market tightness unchanged, this distribution can be approximated by a Poisson distribution.







and pi = uiu
The probability that an offer is matched to an unemployed worker of type i is given by the
matching function in equation (3). This function exhibits constant returns to scale. An increase
of ρio will translate into an increase in the number of offers to a particular worker in group i.
Workers receive offers from formal and informal channels, but only accept one offer. Therefore,
an increment in the probability of finding a candidate through current workers increases the









(1− exp (−θi)) (3)
m(θi) is the expected number of workers hired of type i. It can be shown that ∂m(θi)/∂θi < 0






which is negative as long as 1−exp(−θ) > θexp(−θi). When x = 0, xexp(−x)−(1−exp(−x)) = 0.
The derivative of this function is negative with respect to x for x > 0.
θim(θi) is the exit rate from unemployment for an individual i. The total number of matches
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On the workers’ side, denote Ui as the present discounted utility of an unemployed worker
and Wio as the present discounted value of an employed worker holding a job, with ω(.) being
the wage rate for worker type i in firm type o.
rUi = b+ θim(θi)(E[Wio − Ui]) (4)
rWio = wio + s(Ui −Wio) (5)
An important assumption of the model is that firms choose vo taking into account that em-



















The firm is interested in Lio given ρio. V (Lio) is the firm expected profit. Solving the Bellman





r + s− ρiom(θi)





r + s− ρiom(θi)
⇐⇒ vo = 0
Firms will post a vacancy if and only if the cost of posting the vacancy is equal to the value
of filling the vacancy. If vo different to zero, in each period a firm o chooses the number of
advertised vacancies, so it controls the increment of its total number of employees. In this way,
the firm indirectly influences the number of applicants the social network will produce.
Wages are subject to a bargaining process and the firm can refuse to hire a matched candidate.
The surplus of each match is shared according to the Nash solution of the bargaining problem,
with β ∈ [0, 1] representing the bargaining weight of firms.
βJio = (1− β)(Wi − Ui) (6)
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where Jo is the expected value of a filled job with a worker type i for a firm o. An individual
will accept an offer if it is above the bargained wage. Using equations 6, 4, 5, and 6 we derive
the wage implied by Nash bargaining.
wio = b+ β
r + s+ θim(θi)
r + s+ βθim(θi)− (1− β)ρiom(θi)
(y − b) (7)
The arrival rate of job offers from a firm o to an unemployed worker of type i is directly
proportional to the number of people in the network (group i) who are employed in firm o. An
interpretation for ρio is that it represents the capacity of workers and employers to take advan-
tage of the groups’ social connections. I express ρio using the following functional form.
ρio = f(ρi, ρ
o) (8)
where ρi is the connections that current workers of type i has, and it can be affected by
the number of current employees in each type of firm o, while the employer’s ability to take
advantage of his current employees’ social ties is represented by ρo. Firms are not necessarily
able to exploit their employers social ties because they may lack familiarity with their employees’
cultural background, language, social patterns, and other factors.
Proposition 3.1. In partial equilibrium, taking θ as given, and for a given y,c,b, and s, wages are an
increasing function of the efficiency of the social network ρ. A higher network efficiency induces a higher
job matching rate for the firm with no additional cost. Using equation 7 we can compute the derivative of




β(1− β)m(θi)(y − b)
[r + s+ βθim(θi)− (1− β)ρiom(θi)]2
> 0
The increase on the efficiency of networks for a worker type i in a firm o generates a higher
number of expected matches for workers of type i, given them a better bargaining position in the
firm. Therefore, we would expect the probability of hiring an immigrant worker to be higher the
larger the amount of immigrant workers already employed by a firm. This is what we would call
the ’coworker effect’. Additionally, when group i has more efficient social ties, and the owner is
also more efficient in taking advantage of these social ties to find new workers, firms find even
more costless to use current employees’ connections to find candidates. Workers of type i would
provide more candidates to the firm, therefore, the probability of this group being hired by the
firm will be higher than otherwise.
There are two forces generated by any increment in ρio. On one side, it increases the job offers
using informal channels, more candidates are found using current workers. On the other side, it
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decreases the number of vacancies advertised because firms find more costly to post a vacancy
compared to use informal channels. This substitution effect guarantees the uniqueness of the
equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2. In equilibrium, labor market tightness adjust so that the expected cost of an advertised
vacancy equals the expected profit of a filled position. Using results from the firm’s problem (equation 6)




(1− β)y − b
r + s+ βθim(θi)− (1− β)ρiom(θi)
(9)
The solution is defined only when the right hand side of Equation (9) is positive, that is, when
the marginal value of a filled position is positive. This holds provided that r+s+βθim(θi)−(1−
β)ρiom(θi) > 0. Assuming a θ̄i such that r + s+ βθ̄im(θ̄i)− (1− β)ρiom(θ̄i) = 0, then for values
of θ ∈ [θ̄,+∞], the expression is increasing in θ, so that the marginal value of a filled vacancy is
decreasing with respect to θ, while the cost of a filling vacancy increases with higher values of θ.
Proposition 3.3. Unemployment rate in equilibrium is obtained by equating the flow out of employment






Recall that θim(θi) is the unemployment exit rate. Using lemma (3.3), as ρio increases, the
equilibrium exit rate θim(θi increases reducing ui.
The model has implications the effect of social interactions on market wages that can be com-
pared to our empirical findings below. Different types of firms pay different wages to similar
workers (observable characteristics). Among subgroups with the same y, h, s, firm-group com-
binations with higher ρio will have higher wages and a lower unemployment rate. From Lemma
(3.1) we can see that workers of type i with a ρio higher than that of other types in the same
firm will receive higher wages. If ρio are such that ρnn > ρff > ρfn > ρnf , there will be a
distribution of wages in which natives are paid higher wages when working for native firms,
but are paid lower when they work for immigrant-owned businesses. Similarly, immigrants are
paid better when working for immigrant employers. Within a firm, workers of different groups
are paid differently because their social ties differ in their level of efficiency. That is, foreign-
born and native workers receive different wages when working for an immigrant firm because
links between immigrant employers and immigrant workers result in more worker referrals.
Additionally, workers with higher offer arrival rates earn more in equilibrium. These findings
highlight the potential importance of social connections and social capital for understanding
workers’ employment opportunities and wage differentials.
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4 Empirical Approach
4.1 On the use of social networks
Recent work has suggested that supervisor-employee ethnic matching could result from the use
of networks.17 On the one hand, according to several sociological studies on the ethnic economy,
ethnic solidarity serves to provide entrepreneurs with privileged access to immigrant labor and
to legitimize paternalistic work arrangements (Sanders and Nee [1987] and Model [1997]). Dif-
ferent firms have different recruitment processes, generating an initial sorting of workers types.
On the other hand, networks can also have an impact on wages, providing better matches and
more opportunities to the individual. Ethnic networks can generate informal sources of capi-
tal formation and captive markets, making these firms more self-sufficient and flexible (Volery
[2005]). Social capital becomes another form of capital resource.18.
Immigrant entrepreneurs can take advantage of their language, cultural background and
affinities, to have access to different ethnic groups. Their immigrant status can give them privi-
leged access to sources of labor less available to native entrepreneurs. Immigrant entrepreneurs
routinely employ coethnics (including relatives) at rates vastly above chance levels. The most
important network relationships are based on kinship, friendship, and paisanaje (the feeling of
belonging to a common community of origin).19 Immigrant economies rely upon networks to
locate jobs. On the one hand, referrals by friends or coworkers remove some of the uncertainty
associated with finding a job with unfamiliar employers and increase the chance of finding a
better job match. On the other hand, immigrant entrepreneurs tend to rely on their current em-
ployees to help fill their vacancies. Workers tend to refer individuals that are ’similar’ to them,
from the same group, or with the same characteristics. Referral coworkers could also provide
informal training, show the new worker how to perform the job, and have a good interaction
with the new hire. Moreover, referral coworkers indirectly accept responsibility for new hires.
Employers realize that this practice is beneficial for them as well. Little cost or effort need be
expended when new workers are located through employee contacts.
Previous empirical findings show that Hispanic men report more frequent use of friends and
relatives for job search than non-Hispanic whites, and are also significantly more likely to have
17Networks is not a new concept in the literature. Sociologists have investigated the origins and creation of social
networks for more than 40 years. Rees[1966] draws attention to differences among workers and their use of available
information (formal and informal sources). Job referral is also extensively used in the labor market, as well as family
networks (Granovetter [1995]).
18Social capital in its simplest form is a social network of strong and weak social ties (Light and Gold [2000]).
19Massey[1980].
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obtained their most recent job through personal contacts. Hispanics use informal contacts 32.8
percent more than white non-Hispanics and blacks.20. Recent Latino immigrants are more likely
than blacks or Latino natives to use personal contacts to find jobs(Elliot [2001]). Weak English
skills explain much of this difference. However, this difference does comes not only from the
use of job networks by workers, but also from a greater reliance on referrals in small workplaces
in combination with a concentration of recent immigrants in small firms. Employers also have
a role in this process given that firms’ hiring procedures will affect individuals’ likelihood of
receiving offers from jobs heard about through friends and relatives.
4.2 Small firms
My focus on small firms is motivated by tow observations. First, in larger firms, the separation
between ownership and management could detach the firm’s hiring process from owner charac-
teristics. As Haltiwanger [2006] points out, however, in small firms the decision process is likely
dependent on owner ability and characteristics. When dealing with each worker, small firm
owners could project their tastes and managerial abilities in the hiring and production process
of the firm. Since it is usually the business owner who makes such choices, the identification of
the person responsible for hiring decisions is easier and more relevant for small firms.
Second, immigrant workers are more likely than natives to work in small firms. Andersson
et al. [2007] find that there is a significant market segmentation that appears in any detailed
distribution of workers in firms. Immigrants are more likely to be employed in firms with less
than 10 employees, 70% of immigrants work for small firms. Meanwhile, more than 60% of
native workers are employed at firms with more than 100 employees. The labor force changes
generated by immigration inflows are thus borne primarily by smaller, younger firms. These
firms are more sensitive to immigration shocks. If we only look at aggregate numbers (including
small and big firms), immigration effects will be obscured.
5 Data and Measures
5.1 Sources
In this paper, I use three different databases to match owners’ characteristics to workers’ charac-
teristics. First, I use the Characteristics of Business Owners Survey (CBO) from 1992, and then
match this survey with administrative data from the IRS (Business Register) for the years 1992
20Holzer[1987b], Smith [2000]
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to 1996. To obtain workers characteristics, I use information from the Longitudinal Household-
Employer Dynamics (LEHD) database for the years 1992 to 1996. In this section, I give a brief
description of each database, limitations and discuss how I construct relevant variables used in
the regressions.
The Characteristics of Business Owners (CBO) is produced by the Bureau of the Census. The
1992 release of CBO was the final version of this survey, which formerly was conducted every
five years. This survey was conducted in 1996, along with the economic census, while the ques-
tions in the survey refer to the business’ and owners’ information for years 1992 and 1994. The
CBO is a supplement to the Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises (SMOBE) and Sur-
vey of Women-Owned Businesses (WOB). The survey universe considered was ‘’any business
which files an IRS form 1040, Schedule C (individual proprietors or self-employed persons);
form 1065 (partnership); or form 1120S(Subchapter S corporation) in 1992.”.21 It considers as
business owners those who filed business tax forms as owners of the firm, excluding non-S cor-
porations, with at least 500 dollars in yearly business receipts, and with the largest employment
size category equal to five hundred. Note, that non-S corporations generally have investors, not
decision-making owners, and thus this group is not in the CBO survey’s universe. However, ex-
cluding non-S corporations often excludes the largest employers, making comparisons of small
and large business owners difficult. The CBO provides details about both business owners and
their businesses. The unique firm identifier is the CFN (Census File Number). At the cross-
sectional level this number is unique for each firm.
According to a CBO publication cited in of the Census [1997], almost 62% of the 78,147 firms’
surveys 22 and 59% of the 116,589 owners’ surveys were returned. One possible reason of this
low rate of reply is the difficulty of finding owners of exiting firms after 3-4 years. Almost 70% of
all businesses present in 1992 was still in operation in 1996. This rate is lower for minority-owned
firms (around 66%). Given weighted results, the survey indicates that in 1992, 20% of owners
were in firms with employees. According to the minority-firm surveys, women, Asian, Pacific
Islanders, American Indian, black, and Hispanic owners were typically underrepresented in the
larger employment size classes. Hispanic-owned firms were 3.68% of all employer firms, but just
2.04% of firms with 100 or more employees. Additionally, 90.6% of business owners were born
in the United States, while 9.4% percent were foreign born. 23 The percentage of native-owned
21Characteristics of Business Owners 1992:CBO092-1. U.S. Bureau of the Census (September 1997) and Headd
[1999].
22This is translated into 63% of the 41,297 employer firm surveys.
23A foreign born is an individual that was born outside the USA. CBO has a particular question on whether the
owner was born in the US or abroad.
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firms was higher in the case of larger firms (94.5%). In this paper we focus only on employer
firms.
On average, there exists more than one owner per firm. Looking at CBO(1992), more than
52% of the firms are employers, and almost 41% of employer firms are have one owner. Employer
firms tend to have more owners than non-employer firms. Based on previous research using the
CBO 24, I consider the CBO as a sample of firms even though it is essentially a sample of firm
owners. The resulting complication is that I need to make assumptions to identify the owner
characteristics for multiple-owner firms. As a first attempt , I consider three types of firms: only-
native-owned, only-immigrant-owned, and mix-owned. Using this classification, more than 85%
of employer firms has 1 or 2 owners for all types.
This database has some limitations. First, in the 1992 survey the CBO’s sample universe omits
chapter C corporations. This group of corporations corresponds to bigger businesses; therefore,
comparison between small and large businesses in the CBO must be done with care. Second,
even though I have each firm’s average payroll, I know nothing about the interfirm distribution
of payroll between different types of workers. Third, this survey has zero information on human
capital or occupational characteristics of workers. I try to overcome some of these limitations by
merging CBO with data from Bureau of Labor (UI and ES202) as described below.
The second database used in this paper is the Census Bureau’s Standard Statistical Establish-
ment List (SSEL) or Business Register (BR).25 This data has cleaner information on firms given
that the source of the SSEL is at the administrative level. This database works as a register of
active employer business establishments26 in the United States and its territories. The unit of
information is an enterprise, which can be associated with one or more establishments and with
one or more EIN entities (Employer Identification Number). 27 In this paper we concentrate
on those businesses organizations associated with only one EIN and one establishment, known
as single-establishment enterprises or single-unit firms.28 All of the small firms in this paper corre-
spond to single-unit establishments. The hypothesis that firm owners are the ones making the
24Carrington and Troske [1995]
25Walker [1997] has an extensive discussion on the Census Bureau’s Business Register. The initial source of infor-
mation on businesses is the IRS(Parker and Spletzer [2000]). The SSEL receives three main files from IRS; the Business
Master File (BMF), with information on name, addresses and legal form of organization; the Payroll Tax Return File
(Form 941) containing quarterly payroll and first quarter employment (including March 12th employment); and the
Annual Business Income Tax Return Files with information on receipts/revenues, industry classification. For all three
sources, EIN is the primary business’ id.
26Active employer business establishments are those with payroll at anytime during the past three years, or with
an indication that the business expects to hire employees in the future.
27An EIN entity is an administrative unit assigned by IRS for tax purpose. Under the Federal Insurance Contribu-
tions Act (FICA) every organization with paid employees has to obtain an EIN.
28All the matches between CBO(1992) and SSEL(1992) are in this category.
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main contracting decisions in a firm is more plausible in firms with only one establishment than
otherwise. In the case of younger and smaller firms, this restriction does not exclude many firms.
29 Additionally, businesses have a CFN (Census File Number) as an identifier, which is unique
for single-unit businesses. To follow the firm across time, the longitudinal identifier for each firm
is called alpha; which corresponds to the first 6 digits of firms’ EIN. In the sample, I only follow
firms that survived the entire period 1992 to 1996. Because most non surviving firms did not
respond to the CBO survey and the weights are constructed such that this pattern is considered,
the weighted results are not impacted by this exclusion.30
I take data on industry, legal form of organization and employment from the SSEL files. See
Appendix B for specific description of these variables. Because of the time difference between the
year of information and the year in which the CBO survey was conducted, a significant part of
information on employment is compared with the SSEL’s information on the firm’s employment
and sales31. I use the common unique firm identifier (CFN) to match CBO with SSEL.32 Then I
follow the firm across time until 199633.
The second set of information is associated with the characteristics of workers. This informa-
tion comes from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics database. Information on work-
ers comes from the Unemployment Insurance wage records for a group of states34 and the ES202
data.
Based on availability, I use data from eight States for the years 1992 to 1996. The list of
states includes high immigrant concentration and low immigrant concentration areas (Califor-
nia, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Washington). These files
contain person identifiers that allow researchers to track a worker’s quarterly earnings within a
State across years. I sum over quarters to obtain each worker’s annual earnings. This database
also contains firm identifiers that allow for an exact link between the UI files and other data sets.
The business level identifiers in UI files are State Employer Identification Numbers (SEINs).
Therefore, one can match the UI data with the ES202 data, using SEIN to get information on the
29Haltiwanger et al. [2005]
30Headd [1999].
31The CBO is a retrospective survey. The response rate is affected by the survival rate of the firm and the extent to
which owners can accurately recall past information.
32I use businesses’ CFN, which are the Census Bureau’s preferred intra-year, cross-dataset link. The CFN contains
the EIN firm identifier and is unique for single-unit firms.
33To illustrate the groups of firms included in both databases, I include a short discussion on firms matching rate
in the Appendix A
34More detailed analysis on these records is presented in Abowd et al. [2006], and additional information on date
of birth, place of birth, and gender are obtained for almost all workers in the sample after linking UI wage records to
Census data. 98% of all private, non-agricultural employment is covered by the employer reports.
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EIN, and compare it with the data previously matched using CBO(1992) and Business Register.
For single-unit firms, the units of observation at the firm level used for CBO, SSEL and LEHD
are generally similar.
The UI wage records contain virtually all business employment for the sample states. Earn-
ings reports from I records are more accurate than survey-based earnings data, and one can
obtain information for each worker in a specific firm (or establishment).
Using this database, I follow firms across time from 1992 to 1996 using the unique identifier
within the state. I end up using only those firms that survived during the entire period and did
not change ownership. This group represents 95% of the initial set of firms in 1992.35 Finally, the
data set used in this study is unique in the sense that it contains data from each firm on output
and inputs used in the production process, as well as data on earnings and some demographic
characteristics of each worker in the firm. I use the years 1992 to 1996 for the analysis mainly
because information about owners’ place of birth (i.e. being born in or outside the US) only
available in the Characteristics of Business Owners Survey in 1992. My data tracks the total
payroll and workforce composition of each firm from 1992 to 1996.
The drawback of using UI data is its lack of certain demographic information on workers
such as education and occupation. However, the staff at the LEHD has overcome this limitation
by imputing education using administrative data from the Census Bureau containing informa-
tion such as date of birth, place of birth, geographic area, industry, and sex. In this paper,I use this
imputed information on education36 used in previous work for LEHD research. This variable is a
proxy for individuals’ human capital. I am aware that the lack of occupational information could
be a relevant drawback of the data given that prior research has documented an important role
for occupational segregation in creating different workers’ wage gaps. We might think that im-
migrants tend to concentrate in low-skilled occupations relative to natives. However, as Troske
[1999] and Carrington and Troske [1995] point out, occupations and job titles are less likely to
be sharply defined in small firms, and as a result there could be less occupational segregation in
small firms compared to large firms. Despite this limitation, we have to keep in mind that we
can account for other workers’ characteristics, such as age, sex and imputed education. Given
that workers have varying preferences for place of work depending on the disutility of commut-
ing and amenities of particular areas, the areas where they would be willing to work are better
represented by their actual place of work than their place of residence. Therefore, I need data on
35Few firms were dropped because, initially, the survey’s rate of response was highly correlated with the firms
survival rate, so that most of the firms with information in the survey are surviving businesses.
36See Lengermann et al. [2004] for details on the imputation.
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individuals’ place of work. Location of the firm is obtained using the LEHD database.
5.2 Construction of ex post weights
A relevant technical issue that arises in the process of using different databases, especially when
a survey is included, is the change of sample frame used by the survey database. Additionally,
for smaller geographic areas, differences in industry and geographic information, along with
differences in the scope of industries covered , lead to dissimilarities in the universe considered
by the LEHD data and surveys based on the Economic Census.37
In the design of the CBO survey, four panels were created in addition to divisions by em-
ployer status (employer versus non-employer), 2-digit industry and state. These panels consider
racial categories using owners’ social security and the SSN categories: Asian, Asian-American /
Pacific Islander, Hispanic, Black, and White. These groups were created by the Survey on Mi-
nority Businesses. Therefore, small firms and minority-owned firms are over-represented in the
survey.
The difference between the universe and sampling frames used in the CBO survey implies
that our matched analysis sample will not be representative. Specifically, the sample frame
used in the CBO will over-represent small, minority-owned businesses when linked with the
UI database. To deal with this issue, I follow Abowd et al. [2007] and build ex post weights that
control for the firms’ size, 2-digit industry code, legal form of organization, and employer status.
I follow previous research in the sense that I first construct the fractions of firms in all the cate-
gories in the universe of ES-202.38 This represents the numerator in the ex post weight.39 Then,
I compute the same fractions for the final matched data and use this fraction as the denominator
of the ex post weight. This weight has the property that the distribution of employment by each
category reflects the size distribution of ES-202 considered universe.
The second section of the adjustment procedure considers the construction of an inverse mills
ratio. I use a probit estimation that considers the probability of being matched as a function of
log of employment, legal form of organization, owner’s place of birth (in or out the US), and
log of sales per employee. This section intends to account for the CBO survey’s sampling frame
and the possible selection bias generated by the effect of unobservables on firms exiting from the
37LEHD database covers partially agriculture and public administration industries. Surveys based on the Economic
Census tend to over-represent businesses in areas with high density population.
38The universe of ES-202 is single-unit firms with more than one employee (coworker can be computed only for
these firms) and less than one thousand employees, and are in Economic Census in-scope industries in 1992.
39The universe is all business in the ES-202 with more that 2 employees, not in Agriculture, Mining, nor Public
Administration.
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universe considered to design the sample of the CBO survey. This inverse mills ratio is included
in all regressions. For more details see appendix.
5.3 Firms
To compare the full CBO sample to the final matched sample used in the analysis, I look at de-
scriptive statistics for a set of variables. The final match uses LEHD information from 8 states40,
which includes high and low immigration states. For these states I obtain workers’ and firms’
information. Firms from the agriculture, mining and public administration sectors are not in-
cluded. Additionally, only single-unit businesses are considered. The original matched sample
in the analysis has 7,200 firms, representing 339,040 workers from 1992 to 1996. All results are
weighted by the adjusted-weight discussed in section 5.2.
Table(1) shows two blocks of summary statistics. One block (CBO-SSEL) contains the em-
ployer firms matched from the CBO survey and the BR, while the second block (Sample(CBO-
LEHD)) contains the final matched sample, consisting of the subset of CBO-SSEL data matched
to the LEHD. For each block, this table presents the distribution of firm type across firm size
categories and sectors, together with the average number of owners, average share of immi-
grant workers, de-meaned average log sales per employee, average percentage of immigrants in
the county the firm is located and the counties surrounding this location, and the percentage of
each type of firm. Total population and share of immigrant workers are constructed from the
public 1990 Census, and are based on all Census counties surrounding the location of the firm.
Immigrant firms have a higher proportion of immigrants in the local population than native
and mixed firms. Because immigrants also tend to be geographically segregated, I will use this
variable to control for differences in firms’ local workforce.
In the firm, the workforce of the average immigrant-owned firm contains 38% immigrant
workers. By race the composition is 41% white, 20% Hispanic, 18% Asian, 7% black, and 13%
others. The distribution of firms across sectors and firm sizes for each type of firm is very similar,
except for the tendency of immigrant-owned firms to be in retail or services, and this distribution
is only slightly changed after matching the original database with the LEHD database.
From the table we observe that immigrant-owned firms’ log of sales per employee is slightly
higher than native-owned firms. Actually, on average, native owned firms have the lowest log
labor productivity. In general, firms are concentrated in size categories with fewer than 50 em-
ployees. Meanwhile, all firm types are more represented in sectors such as Services, Retail,
40Those states with available data in 1992
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Manufacturing and Construction. Sole proprietorships represent more than 50% of immigrant
and native firms. The average number of owners by firm type (owner type) keeps very similar
levels as the unmatched sample. The average number of owners by owner birthplace is similar,
except, as expected, for mix-owned firms which by definition have two or more owners. Table
(1) illustrates that this patterns are similar in the original CBO sample and the final matched
CBO-LEHD sample.
In the original matched data there is a percentage of firms with unknown owners’ place of
birth. I decide to exclude this group from further analysis. Given that, on average, the charac-
teristics of this unknown group are similar to the rest of the sample (see Appendix(C) for t-tests
and a chi-square analysis), I don’t expect this exclusion will dramatically affect my findings.
I also drop those firms with less than two employees and I only consider male workers.
Workers should have at least one coworker, and the analysis of earnings is net of other labor
supply factors that could affect female workers differently. After these restrictions, the final
sample is reduced to 4,478 firms and 214,398 workers from 1992 to 1996.
5.4 Workers
Among the relevant workers’ characteristics available in my data are age, immigration status
(place of birth), date of entry in the US (date of SSN application), education, quarterly wage,
and race. I sum over quarters to obtain each worker’s annual earnings, and then compute real
earnings based on 1992 dollars. The data set used for the analysis includes all male workers
with positive earnings. On the distribution of workers, Table ( 2) and Figure (1) show the pro-
portions of workers by age, race, sex, education, owner type,size, and sector. Additionally, I
report the mean age, education and earnings of both immigrants and natives and of all workers
in the reduced sample. In the data, foreign workers represent almost 24% of the total number of
workers.
Similar to previous studies, on average, although differences don’t seem to be large, foreign
born workers tend to be less educated, younger and tend to have lower income than native
workers(Borjas [1994]). The fraction of workers across age categories, however, is similar for
both types of workers in age categories 40 years and more.
The share of workers with a high school diploma or less is over 60% for both immigrant and
natives. Immigrants are more concentrated in the high school dropout and high school graduate
categories. Looking at sectoral distribution, both foreign and native workers are concentrated in
Construction, Manufacturing, Retail and Services, with natives more likely to be in Construction
23
while immigrants in Manufacturing.41 For small businesses, foreigners seem more likely to be
working for immigrant than for native owners, while the opposite is true for native workers.
43% of immigrant workers are employed in immigrant firms and 49% are employed in native
firms.
Most of the immigrants are Hispanics or Asians, while natives are mainly either white or
black. Although there is a fraction of native-Hispanic and native-Asian workers, these propor-
tions are less than 5%. The racial and ethnic categories follow the SSA codes, which form a set of
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories. I also include information on whether
the worker is full or part time. A worker is full time if he or she has worked during the full year
(worker has positive earnings all four quarters). Most of the survey corresponds to informa-
tion from firms located in MSAs. However, I include a variable that identifies those firms and
workers located outside a MSA. Almost 90% of the workers holds jobs in a firm located inside a
MSA.
Looking at place of birth in detail, Mexican, Salvadorian, Indian, and Chinese workers are the
most represented immigrant groups in the data. At the national level, these are also the largest
immigrant groups in the US according to Census 1990. In the data, native owners employ almost
75% of the total workforce.
5.5 Measuring coworker share
I follow Andersson et al. [2008]’s measure of coworker share. The immigrant coworker share is







Where Ik is one when the worker is an immigrant. Therefore, this measure will contain the
fraction of immigrant coworkers of an employee in a firm. This measure is generally used in
concentration analysis. Here I use it as an indication of workforce composition in the firm.
6 Analysis of New Hires, Earnings of Workers and Skill Distribution
6.1 New Hires
For the analysis of hiring procedures, I look at the type, race and ethnic composition of new
hires by type of owner. During the period of analysis (1992-1996), there were 147,373 new hires.
41One explanation for this pattern is that informal and undocumented immigrants workers are not largely covered
by the database.
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I identify a new hire in the data by following a firm and looking at those workers that accessed
the sample during the period of analysis. I track information on each new worker. Table (3)
shows the distribution of new hires by type of owner. While new hires include a large share of
natives for every type of owner, the proportions of newly hired immigrants for immigrant and
mixed-owned firms (more than 30%) are almost three times the proportion of immigrants hired
in native-owned firms (almost 12%).
The second section of Table (3) displays the composition of new hires by race and ethnic-
ity. Hispanics and Asians correspond to more than 35% of immigrant-owned firms’ new hires.
Again, this represents almost three times the proportion hired by native firms. Both immigrant
and native firms hired more new workers later in the sample period as the economy recovered
from the 1991-1992 recession (see Figure 1).
6.2 Earnings of Workers
In this section, I look at workers’ earnings. On average, immigrant workers have lower wages
than natives. Most of the explanations given by the literature are based on human capital for-
mation. Immigrants have lower host country abilities and generally less education than natives.
However, even after controlling for some of these characteristics, immigrants tend to receive
lower wages than observationally similar natives (Borjas [1994]). But do workers receive dif-
ferent wages than their counterfactual group regardless of who they work for? To answer this
question I undertake two different exercises. First, I look at the average real log annual earnings
of each worker type across owner types. I also look at these statistics for different groups of firms
defined by the fraction of similar coworkers in the firm. This analysis is a first look at the impact
on firm owner types on earnings. Second, I estimate owner type wage effects after controlling
for a number of firm and worker characteristics, and evaluate the sources of wage differentials.
The natural log of real annualized earnings of each worker comes from LEHD-UI records.42
Table (4) shows how average wages change according to the type of owner. The last column of
the table shows the t-test computed for worker type wages for each owner type. A t-test can
reject the null hypothesis that the mean of immigrant worker wages and the mean of native
worker wages are the same at the 90% level.
Looking at Table (4) we notice three relevant outcomes for wage differential analysis. First,
42When we take the average log annual earnings for each type of firm, we find that it is slightly below the log of
annual payroll per employee in the SSEL database. According to internal documentation on the ES202/SSEL joint
project, annual payroll in SSEL files includes non-wage payments, such as benefit payments, retirement pension
funds, annuity funds, supplemental benefit funds, etc, which are not included in the UI files.
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immigrants are paid slightly less by native than by immigrant owners. In general, they are paid
the lowest when working for native owners. Second, native workers are paid significantly less in
immigrant owned businesses. Third, on average native owned firms pay more than immigrant
owned firms. Fourth, mix-owned firms significantly pay less to immigrant workers. However,
these firms employ a lower proportion of immigrant workers than immigrant-owned firms.
In sum, immigrant workers end up receiving lower log annual earnings than native workers.
If we combine the first three outcomes, we can see that much of the difference between the
log annual wages of immigrants and natives comes from immigrants’ propensity to work in
immigrant owned firms. These firms pay the lowest wages, and the difference in immigrant
earnings between immigrant and native firms is small. Additionally, native owned firms pay
immigrant workers less than native workers (see Table(4)).
It is important to highlight the relevance of having actual earnings of each employee at the
firm level, so we can exploit these variations to identify the effect of owner types on individuals’
wages. Therefore, individual level wages are used in the regressions analyzed in the next sec-
tions. Table (4) would not be possible if we didn’t have data on both employers and employees’
characteristics. Our unique database allows us to compare average earnings between workers
of different types holding a job in the same type of firm, and workers of the same type (native or
immigrant) working for different types of owners.
I now perform a similar exercise, but separating firms by the share of coworkers similar to
the worker (see Table 5). I use the median value over time of coworker shares at each firm.
This measure is different from the measure of immigrant coworker share defined previously,
in that I define as coworker share the share of workers that are of a similar type to the worker
in a specific firm. For instance, the coworker share of a native worker is the share of native
born workers in the firm excluding the worker. The second column (%) shows the percentage of
workers of each type in the firm accordingly below or above the coworker share median. We can
see in the table that the previous findings remain valid. Foreign-born employers pay the lowest
wages, on average. However, for businesses with coworker share below the median, immigrant
employees working for immigrant employers are paid slightly more than immigrant employees
working for native employers. Additionally, workers are paid more when working with similar
coworkers. When workers’ coworker share is below the median, employers pay lower annual
wages. More than 65% of the businesses have a mixed workforce, that is, the share of immigrant
coworker is neither one nor zero (0 < share < 1).
The outcomes in these tables do not control for individuals’ characteristics, so we don’t know
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the profiles of native and foreign employees holding jobs in these businesses. Nevertheless, these
findings are striking. Immigrant owners pay the lowest on average. Furthermore, they are able
to pay natives less than the rest of the market. This motivates the question of what type of native
workers work for immigrant employers.
6.3 Sorting by Skill
Sorting by skill is a possible cause of sorting by owner type. The incentive to combine workers
of identical skills within the same firm has been documented previously (Kremer and Maskin
[1996]). Job descriptions and skill requirements are also a concern as characteristics of employ-
ers and employees are correlated. Additionally, if firms of different types have different skill
mix productivity, immigrant owners could use more intensively labor than native businesses,
immigrant employers would tend to hire more and low-skilled workers than native firms. Im-
migrants, Hispanics, and other minority groups have, on average, lower skill so they may tend
to work in low-skill sectors and low-skill jobs regardless of the owner type. Immigrant owners,
on the other hand, may tend to concentrate in low-skill sectors because they also have low skill
levels. Table (6) shows workers’ distribution by owner’s skill requirement. The skill requirement
for a firm is computed using Census 1990 data after compiling the share of workers by industry
at the 2-digit level that have low educational attainment(less than high school) and high edu-
cational attainment(more than high school). High skill industries are those in which more than
50% of workers have at least high school diploma. The remaining industries are low skill. The
idea is to illustrate whether specific owner and worker types are concentrated in a particular
skill group.
Not surprisingly, the table shows that low-education industries have higher fraction of im-
migrant workers than firms in high-education industries. Immigrant firms continue to have a
bigger proportion of immigrant workers, except for mix-owned businesses. Results are similar
breaking down by workers’ race. However, it is worth mention that immigrant-owned firms are
more than 60% of the group of low-skill.
To account for part of this pattern, I latter in the regressions include the share of workers in





The ideal data to analyze the effect of owners, coworkers, and social connections on individual
labor market outcomes requires information on individuals’ labor market histories, earnings,
and, specifically, the employer’s source of ex-ante information about the job seekers that apply
to its open vacancies. With this information we would be able to measure for the actual hiring
policies that firms use to find new workers. Unfortunately, I don’t have detailed data on hiring
procedures used by firms. However, I do have a good deal of valuable information on the firms
and workers. The workers in each sample firm can be divided into different categories such as
native and foreign-born, or by race/ethnicity43 to infer workers’ and candidates’ likely social
connections. This, together with information on the type of owner, will help infer the use of
social ties in the firm’s hiring process and its effect on workers’ earnings. More specifically,
network structure refers to the number of ties an individual has (Smith, 2000). In this paper, I try
to identify the impact of networks by using the proportion of coworkers who are potentially tied
to newly hired worker. Besides identify the type of owner for whom the employee works, I use
the proportion of similar employees in the firm at the time the new worker is hired as a measure
of the network link between coworkers, employers, and the new worker.
Following each firm, from 1992 to 1996, I obtain the number of employees who work for the
firm and their earnings. I also have the total number of workers possessing any given set of
demographic characteristics at each period of time. Following the definition of networks used
in previous literature, I compute the share of similar coworkers for each new hire at each firm in
each period, assuming that a background implies at least a weak network connection between
individuals.44
A key challenge in linking owners and employees is that the characteristics of both own-
ers and employees may be correlated with other characteristics of a workplace and its location.
Section 6.3 above gives preliminary evidence on sorting by skill. The correlation between owner
and employee types could also be a result of residential segregation of workers and owners (spa-
tial mismatch). Job descriptions and skill requirements are also a concern, as characteristics of
43White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian.
44At this point, it is worth to mention that even though immigrants are very diverse and it is a group that reflects
a multiple gamma of ethnic/cultural backgrounds, not necessarily captures by the denomination of being foreign-
born, it is also true that immigrants tend to have similar strategies to enter into the labor market regardless of their
cultural background. Using migrant networks is one common factor among foreign-born workers, especially for new
immigrants (Porter and Wilson [1980], Light [2006]).
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employers and employees are correlated. Immigrants, and in particular Hispanics, tend to be
low skilled and therefore are likely to work in low-skilled sectors and low-skilled jobs regardless
of the owner type. However, at the same time, immigrant owners could tend to concentrate in
low-skill sectors, perhaps because they also have low skill levels.
Because the proportions of immigrants are unequally distributed across sectors and regions
, I control for the 2-digit industry and geographic location of each firm. There exist sectors
such as Retail, Services and Construction where immigrants represent a significant proportion
of the workforce 45. We also see this pattern in the geographic distribution of the immigrant
population. For instance, according to Census 2000, cities such as Los Angeles and New York
represented more than 30% of the total immigrant population in the country. To account for
these concerns I need to control for fixed attributes of the workplace and the local labor market,
and also for local trends in labor pool demographics. Therefore, I estimate the model controlling
for characteristics of the firm (Fj) and local community (Zj). These controls include the im-
migrant workforce population and population density in the local community, 2-digit industry
code dummies, firm’s size (log of reported employment), and legal form of organization. I also
include the share of the firm’s workers in the four education categories discussed previously.
Previous research has remarked the impact of English language ability in the use of networks
and the level of wages for immigrant workers. I capture this feature by interacting the 2-digit
industry dummy with a English speaker dummy. This interaction intends to capture whether
language is used differently at work.
In the wage regressions, I also control for individual characteristics (Xj), including worker’s
age, education and a dummy for working full time. The composition of the labor pool might
also be affected by changes over time in labor supply and demand. For example, white natives
may be more likely to work in low-wage retail jobs when labor markets are weak. Therefore, I
also include a dummy variable for each of the years in the sample (Mt) to control for national
fluctuations in the labor market.
The identification strategy exploits variation across owner types for otherwise similar firms.
By controlling for a rich set of firm characteristics I can narrow the possible alternative explana-
tions for any residual correlation between owner type and worker outcomes.
45This can be also related to the fact that these sectors are also highly represented by relatively smaller firms than
in Manufacturing, for instance.
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7.1.1 Analysis of firms hiring patterns
This section starts by looking at the hiring patterns of the firm, estimating a model that predicts
the probability that a newly hired employee is an immigrant. Firm hiring decisions indirectly re-
flect the way owners can use current employees to fill their job vacancies. I use a linear probabil-
ity model to estimate the likelihood that a newly hired worker is of a particular type (immigrant
or from a specific race/ethnic group).46
Pr(new hire= groupi)kjt=
c+B1 ∗Oj + δ ∗Wjt−1 +B2 ∗Oj ∗Wjt−1 + Φ ∗ Fj + Z ∗ Zkj + T ∗Mt + εkjt (12)
In a regression with both owner type and coworker share included, the estimated coefficient
on owner type will capture only the direct impact of owner type on hiring, not the total effect,
which will include both the direct effect and the indirect effect coming through owner type’s
effect on coworker share. The use of employee referrals can be correlated with the type of owner
and can affect hiring pattern if owners have the tendency to hire same-group individuals. When
employees tend to refer same-group workers, the owner type’s effect may be amplified. If we
believe that the share of similar coworkers is a good proxy for social connections, these exercises
illustrate the combined result of owner effect and hiring patterns.
Oj is a vector of dummy variables for owner type. Where k, j and t designate the worker,
firm type, and time respectively. When group i refers to an immigrant, and immigrant-owned
firms are the omitted group. B1 represents the vector of coefficients associated with the impact of
owner type on hiring. The elements of this vector are expected to be negative when the omitted
group is the same type as the new hire. For instance, the coefficient on native owners would
be negative if immigrant-owned firms are more likely to hire new immigrant workers. Wjt−1
corresponds to the vector of the proportion of workers of type each type i at the firm in the
previous period. An interaction between owner type and Wjt−1 is included to asses differences
in use of current employees’ networks across owner types. I also control for firm characteristics
Fj , year dummies Mt, and local community information and state dummies Zkj .
I assume that the error (εkjt) in equation 12 are independent and identically distributed
across firms, but not within firms. To correct for non spherical disturbances, I estimate Huber-
White robust standard errors clustered by firm. This procedure is used in all subsequent estima-
46I use a linear probability model over a Probit (Logit) model because I don’t need to restrict the sample to firms
that hire at least one new worker of each type. This restriction could introduce sample selection bias because firms
with zero hiring could have a completely different policy than those with a least one new hire.
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tions. I cluster the errors by firm since firms in the sample may have hired more than one worker
and thus may have repeated observations.
For purposes of analysis, I estimate different versions of equation (12) and look at the impact
of the addition of controls on the estimate of B1 and B2. The first regression includes only
year dummies; subsequent specifications add controls one by one. Most of the literature on
hiring networks argues that current workers’ referrals are more important to firm hiring patterns
than owners’ personal networks. Owners are likely to hire individuals from their residential
area. However, current workers have a larger and more diverse set of connections that can
be exploited by the firm. I am not able to disentangle these effects directly. Nevertheless, by
allowing owners of different groups to make use of their workers’ social ties differently, the
estimated interaction effects can measure the ability of owners to use social ties.
Table (7) shows the probability of a new hire being an immigrant given the characteristics
of the firm, its community and the share of coworkers in the firm. Controlling only for year
dummies, native owners are 25 percentage points less likely to hire a new immigrant worker
than immigrant firms. This difference is significantly reduced, to 3.5 percentage points, when
we include the share of immigrant coworkers. The inclusion of other characteristics of the firm
and the local community has smaller impacts the relative likelihood of native versus immigrant
owners hiring a new immigrant worker. There is a positive and significant impact on the prob-
ability of the new hire being an immigrant when the proportion of workers in the firm with
low education (high school dropout) increases. The owner effect diminishes and the difference
in the probability of hiring a Hispanic between immigrant and native owners is 2.5 percentage
pointas. The coworker effect is smaller too. Although, we can see the same significant ’persis-
tence’ in the pattern of workers hired by each type of firm. The interaction effect between owner
and coworker slightly decreases for both mix and native owners. However, the pattern remains
equal. The share of similar type coworker is smaller in mix and native owned firms than in im-
migrant owned firms. Immigrant employers can take advantage more efficiently of its current
immigrant workers than other types of employers. We should be cautious when analyzing these
results. I control for a vast series of covariates to control for all possible observables that can be
correlated to employer and employee effect, however, the presence of unobservables correlated
to firm and worker interactions can bias the results. As another exercise, I compute the firm
fixed-effect version of the model by including firm dummies. The last column of Table (7) shows
the results. The share of immigrant coworkers in the firm at the time of the new hire remains
positive, high, and significant.
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7.1.2 Hiring Process by Race/Ethnicity
I next consider the probability that a new hire comes from a particular race/ethnic group: white,
black, Hispanic and Asian. That is, I estimate equation (12), setting i equal to a particular racial
category. Tables 8 and 9 show the effect of owner types and share of type i coworkers, and other
type of coworkers, at the time of hiring on the probability that a new hire is Hispanic, Asian,
white, or black respectively.
The likelihood of a new worker being Hispanic significantly decreases when the employer
is native. This result holds even after including a exhaustive list of controls(Table 8). The direct
impact of owner type is reduced, however, once we control for the share of Hispanic coworker.
For instance, having Hispanics as current employees in the firm increases the probability that
the new worker to be Hispanic (by up to 88% in immigrant owned firms). The impact of His-
panic coworkers is smaller for native owned firms. In section (6.3) we discussed the distribution
of workers by average industry-level skill requirement. As a proxy to control for this effect, I
include the share of workers by four educational attainment at the firm and the fraction of work-
ers of similar type in the local community. The results show that a higher share of low-educated
workers in the firm increases the probability that the new worker is Hispanic. I also include the
share of workers of each group race. The inclusion of these shares decreases the impact of the
similar coworker share.
Looking at Asian new hires (Table 8), we again find that native employers are less likely to
hire Asian workers. The inclusion of additional controls reduces the difference in probability
of hiring an Asian between immigrant and native owned firms. Another interesting result is
that Asians are less likely to be hired in firms with bigger proportion of workers with education
attainment below the high school level.
Whites and blacks are more likely to be hired by native firms (See Table (9)). However, the
probability that a new hire is black or white depends on the share of blacks or whites in the
firm at the time of the recruitment process. The significance of the immigrant owner effect on
black hiring vanishes when I include the coworker share in the regression. The column called
FE shows the results of the regression after including firm fixed effects. The persistence of hiring
patterns slightly decreases but it is still high and significant. The largest drop is presented by the
probability of blacks to be hired when the share of coworker whites increases.
I also experiment with estimating a multinomial logit model to account for the case that
employers may simultaneously choose among different types of workers. The estimation sample
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is then restricted to firms that hire at least one worker of each race group during the period
1992-1996. This restriction eliminates more homogeneous firms. The new sample contains 2,662
firms. I investigate how the owner type and share of different types of workers at the time of
hiring affects the type/race of the new hire. I estimate a model47 that aims to reveal whether
the birthplace of the employer affects the likelihood that a new worker is of the same type as
opposed to other types, conditional on having accessed to the firm during the period of analysis
and controlling for the characteristics of the worker and the firm.
Pr(new hire is worker type: i)kjt =
exp(ci +Bi1 ∗Oj + δi ∗Wjt−1 + Φi ∗ Fj + Zi ∗ Zkj + T i ∗Mt + εikjt)∑5
s=1 exp(c
s +Bs1 ∗Oj + δs ∗Wjt−1 + Φs ∗ Fj + Zs ∗ Zkj + T s ∗Mt + εskjt)
(13)
with i = 1, ..., 4 for the four race groups: white, black, Asian, and Hispanic. This procedure
makes very strong assumptions with respect to the relevance of other alternatives. The odds ratio
of any two options is assumed independent of the other alternatives. This feature is important to
consider when more than two alternatives are included. To test the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives assumption, I conduct a Hausman test by excluding each outcome category in turn.
The test indicates that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the odds of one outcome happening
are independent of other alternatives. Additionally, I perform Wald tests for combination of
categories. The tests reject the null hypotheses that all coefficients associated with a given pair
of outcomes are zero (except intercepts). I cluster the errors by firm since observations within
firms are not independent. The results for this regression are shown in Tables (10) and (11).
Table (10) shows the change in log odds comparing two alternatives. The change in log odds
between hiring a white worker versus hiring a Hispanic or an Asian decreases when the firm
is immigrant-owned. The share of white coworkers significantly increases in the log odds of a
white being hired. I also show the predicted hiring probabilities for each owner type (Table 11)
computed at the means of all firms and dummy variables. Immigrant owners are 3 percentage
points more likely to hire Asians and Hispanics than native firms. These results support the
analysis in the previous section.
7.1.3 Workers’ earnings and analysis of results
I estimate the effects of owner type and coworkers on workers’ compensation by using a human
capital approach. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of workers’ real annual wages.
47I specifically estimate a mixed logit model that incorporates both characteristics of the individual and the alter-
natives.
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The regression includes dummy variables for owner type, the share of same kind coworkers,
worker type, and other firm characteristics. Using wage estimates at the individual level, we can
evaluate the impact of owners’ characteristics on wage differentials by using equation (14).
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(14)
where k identifies information on the worker and j refers to information on the firm. wkj
stands for worker k’s log real annual earnings at firm j. Ik is a dummy variable for whether the
worker is an immigrant. In an effort to establish how much the immigrant earnings differential
is due to differences in predetermined personal characteristics, I add a vector Xi of employee
characteristics including age, age squared, education, sex, and race. Oj is a vector of dummy
variables for owner type: with B3 their corresponding coefficients. COWkj stands for the pro-
portion of immigrant coworkers in the firm (explained in section 5.5). The expected sign for
β1 is negative, assuming that immigrants earn lower wages, and its significance indicates that
there is enough variation across the different worker types. With the inclusion of owner type
dummies, the estimate of β1 will represent the difference in wages between immigrants and na-
tives in native owned firms. The sum of β1, and the B3 and B4 coefficients corresponding to
an immigrant owned firm will be positive if immigrant workers earn higher wages when work-
ing for immigrant-owned businesses than native workers in an immigrant firm. The coworker
share accounts for the potential impact on wages of having better connections to similar types of
workers in the firm. The interaction between COWkj and the vector of owner types is included
to asses whether the effect of coworkers differs according to the type of employer that is hiring
the employee. I explore a 3-way interaction among owner type, worker type, and the immigrant
coworker share. In equation (14), B2Xk absorbs the effects of variations in personal character-
istics. We would expect estimates of β1 and the vector B3 to change after including workers’
characteristics. It is equal to one according to each owner’s type represented in the sample, B3 is
the vector of coefficients associated with those dummy variables.
We should be aware of the potential presence of omitted variable bias. Unobservable char-
acteristics could bias estimated coefficients in equation (14). Ignoring these unobservables could
causes us to overestimate the impact of owner type and immigrant coworkers on individual
earnings. High ability workers of type k should look for firms that pay higher earnings. If
native-owned firms offer higher wages and employ these high ability workers, the estimated
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model would not be capturing the effect of owner type on workers’ earnings; rather it would
be capturing individuals’ ability to find better jobs. Also, worker preferences and comparative
advantage can influence the results. Variations in preferences for particular job characteristics
across different workers could provide an alternative explanation for both earnings differentials
and sorting. To account for some of this variation, I include the fraction of workers in the firm
with education lower than high school, equal to high school, higher than high school with some
college, and equal to college or higher. The omitted category is the group of college graduate.
Characteristics of firms (Fj) and of local community (Zj) are also included. These controls
include the population share of each group in the local community, population density, firm’s
size (log of reported employment), and legal form of organization. Mt are year dummies.
The first column of Table (12) shows results from a baseline model including immigrant sta-
tus, individual age, education, and part-time status, but excluding other variables of interest.
The table reports the betas estimated by equation (14). To make the analysis, I transform these
unstandardized β coefficients with the usual formula [(eβ−1)∗100], I can analyze the percentage
change in wages associated with a 1-unit change in a continuous independent predictor variable.
In the case of a dichotomous independent variable, I interpret the percentage wage difference in
the target category compared to the reference category. After controlling by typical human capi-
tal variables, full-time immigrant workers earn about 8% less than native workers (3,293 dollars
less each year). When working for native employers this difference increases to 11%. Meanwhile,
immigrant workers earn 10% more than native workers in immigrant owned firms (4,398 dollar
more each year).
The human capital results in Table (12) are consistent with the literature. Age positively
affects wages but at a decreasing rate. Education is significant and positive. Part-time workers
earn less than full-time workers. The inclusion of additional independent variables does not
modify these patterns. After controlling for individual characteristics, immigrant workers are
paid less than native workers in native firms, but they receive a significantly higher wage than
native workers when working for immigrant firms. The inclusion of the share of immigrant
coworkers produces interesting results. Immigrants earn more when working for immigrant
employers and when the immigrant coworker share increases. The opposite is true for native
workers. In general, a native worker receives higher wages if he or she works for a native firm
with a low share of immigrant workers.
These results are striking in two senses. One, the ability to look at individual wages and iden-
tify the types of firm owners is only possible with this database. We have individual earnings
35
for each firm. Although immigrants are paid less on average, they find themselves in a better
position when working for immigrant firms. Second, we can look at the entire workforce and
identify the individuals’ types of coworkers in the firm. This allows us to make inference on the
impact of social ties on worker wages.
8 Conclusion
This paper explores the analysis of
Using a matching framework, This paper explores the potential mechanisms explaining the
interconnection between owner’s and coworkers’ characteristics and workers’ hiring patterns
and waget. Furthermore, it takes advantage of unique employee and employer matched micro-
data from the U.S. Census Bureau to examine the effect of owner types and coworker types on
firms’ hiring patterns and workers’ earnings. Particular attention was paid to the nativity of
employers and to the share of similar coworkers (by nativity and ethnicity) at firms when new
workers are hired. I examined the effect of those variables on hiring rates and on the wage
differential between immigrants and natives.
There would be a distribution of wages in which workers are paid higher when working for
same-type owners. Within a firm, workers of different groups are paid differently because their
social ties differ in their level of efficiency. That is, foreign-born and native workers receive dif-
ferent wages when working for an immigrant firm because links between immigrant employers
and immigrant workers result in more worker referrals. Additionally, workers with higher offer
arrival rates earn more in equilibrium.
Firms with high share of skilled workers have incentive to use referrals, because the chances
of finding another skilled worker through referral are higher than through the market (posting
vacancies). This is true as long as the probability of referring a high skilled worker is higher than
the distribution of skilled workers in the market. Nevertheless, even an immigrant firm with a
low level of skilled workers could be able to generate a more efficient connection with its current
workers if it can exploit the rate of worker replication.
In sum, the better the employer can get information from its current employees, in this case
the better immigrant firms obtain information from its current immigrant employees, the lower
the uncertainty on the expected productivity, the lower the informational cost, and the lower
the recruitment cost. The informal mechanism would be relatively more efficient than the use of
formal recruitment processes. The more skilled workers the firm has the higher the incentives to
36
use informal channels to reproduce the characteristics of its current workers.
In general, employees’ wages are affected by the type of owner of the firm. For native em-
ployees the effect on wages is higher when working for immigrant employers. Natives are paid
lower when working for immigrant employers, and in these firms natives have lower average
earnings than immigrants. One explanation for these findings is that immigrant bosses have
a better understanding of and networking with the immigrant community, and, therefore, can
better find and contract immigrant workers than native-owned firms. Why can’t native-owned
firms quickly adjust and find this cheaper labor? Lack of language knowledge and lack of net-
working make it harder for native bosses to find immigrant workers. This findings justify fur-
ther analysis of differences in contracting ability across employers. The evidence that the type of
owner matters for wage differentials among workers also implies an important role for person-
nel policy.
In addition to examining the effect of owners and coworkers on differences between immi-
grants and natives, I evaluate the effect on ethnically(racially) different groups. Individual’s race
is an important source of variation across workers. The evidence suggests that employers tend
to hire workers from the same ethnic group. A significant persistence in the hiring process is ob-
served across all types of owners, even after controlling for firm fixed effects. Immigrant owners
tend to hire more Hispanics and Asians, while native owners hire more blacks and whites.
By shedding light on the ways workers and employers interact in the labor market to affect
job and wage outcomes, this research makes a contribution to the sociology, labor economics,
and demography literatures. It also opens up numerous avenues for future research. On the
microeconomic side, we can further evaluate job flows and wage profiles of workers inside dif-
ferent types of firms. The analysis of assimilation can also take advantage of the results presented
here, to further our understanding of adjustment process of new immigrant workers. The em-
pirical analysis in this paper makes some progress toward mitigating biases of skill sorting. This
paper controls for a broad number of observable characteristics that try to capture other expla-
nations for segregation. However, if owner unobservable characteristics are correlated to worker
characteristics, the results of the analysis would be biased. Different empirical approaches such
as instrumental variable or fixed-effect approaches could be good options in future research,
although this would demand a more exhaustive matched database that follows workers after
leaving the firm and firms after ownership changes. Increasing the scope of the analysis by look-
ing at one industry could also provide information on the costs and benefits of firm recruitment
processes. For instance, we could examine with more detail the effect of worker type concen-
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tration on firms’ labor productivity. On an aggregate view, we can evaluate the effect of large
flows of immigrants on the economy with the combined analysis of push and pull factors. Im-
migrant firms and immigrant workers seem to match quickly in the labor market. The analysis
on unemployment and aggregate vacancies in the labor market can be extended to incorporate
the findings in this paper.
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Age 34.01 34.14 34.11
(13.33) (12.02) (13.13)
Education 13.04 13.16 13.13
(2.76) (2.94) (2.79)




Under 25 18.09 24.43 22.91
25-39 51.64 43.03 45.10
40+ 30.26 32.54 31.99
EDUCATION
High School Dropout 8.89 7.41 7.77
High School Graduate 59.27 59.26 59.26
Some College Education 30.81 32.00 31.71
College Graduate 1.04 1.33 1.26
SECTOR
Construction 7.92 18.37 15.85
Manufacturing 37.08 26.13 28.76
Transportation and Utilities 3.81 7.11 6.31
Wholesale 14.17 14.16 14.16
Retail 19.33 16.63 17.28
FIRE 1.36 1.58 1.52
Services 16.34 16.03 16.10
SIZE
2-4 2.18 1.65 1.78
5-9 4.70 4.23 4.34
10-19 9.27 9.32 9.31
20-49 19.32 21.23 20.77
50-99 18.96 18.91 18.92
100+ 45.57 44.66 44.88
RACE
White 17.36 75.07 61.18
Hispanic 47.21 4.85 15.04
Asian 22.76 0.93 6.18
Black 1.71 11.21 8.92
Other 10.88 4.67 6.16
TYPE OF OWNER
Immigrant 42.70 12.10 19.46
Mixed 8.34 5.67 6.31
Native 48.96 82.23 74.22
Part-time 43.67 37.39 38.90
In MSA 97.23 83.38 86.71
All 24.06 75.94 100
Note: Number of observations equal to 214,398 workers. Statistics based on weighted outcomes. Standard Deviations in
parenthesis. Male workers with positive earnings in a year. Log annual wage in 1992 dollars.
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Table 3: Average Race and Ethnic Composition of New Hires by Owner’s Type
Owner Type
Worker type/ race/ethnicity Immigrant Mixed Native All
Immigrant 33.30 37.10 11.56 14.80
Native 66.70 62.90 88.44 85.20
Hispanic 20.14 22.32 10.14 11.50
Asian 16.09 12.78 2.65 4.26
White 48.20 49.80 73.61 70.40
Black 6.49 8.41 8.68 8.46
Other 9.09 6.70 4.92 5.38
Note: Number of Observations equal to 147,373. Male workers with positive earnings in a year.
Table 4: Means Earnings by Owner and Worker Type
Variable=log(annual earnings) (%) Mean STD T-test
owner = Immigrant
Immigrant 50.30 8.35 1.47
Native 49.70 8.12 1.67
All 100.00 8.23 1.64 24.20
owner = Mix
Immigrant 35.94 8.52 1.86
Native 64.06 9.04 1.71
All 100.00 8.71 1.82 -16.07
owner = Native
Immigrant 15.87 8.32 1.73
Native 84.13 8.38 1.88
All 100.00 8.37 1.73 -5.83
Note:STD indicates standard deviation. Log annual wage in 1992 dollars. Using workers during the period
1992-1996.(*)T-tests are computed on the difference between average wages of immigrant and native workers for
each specified owner type.
Table 5: By Coworker Share: Mean Earnings by Owner and Worker Type
Coworker Share
Below the median Above the median
Variable=log(annual earnings) (%) Mean STD (%) Mean STD
owner = imm
Native 33.64 7.37 1.71 66.36 7.67 1.53
Immigrant 66.69 7.98 1.68 33.31 8.19 1.34
all 48.09 7.74 1.51 51.91 7.82 1.70
owner = mix
Native 26.42 7.90 1.79 73.58 8.39 2.98
Immigrant 66.36 8.67 1.63 33.64 6.91 1.21
all 39.07 8.32 1.75 60.93 8.13 1.98
owner = usa
Native 6.96 7.74 1.81 93.04 8.38 1.89
Immigrant 91.48 7.80 1.77 8.52 7.68 1.96
all 20.33 7.78 1.79 79.67 8.31 1.92
Note: STD indicates standard deviation. Log annual wage in 1992 dollars. Statistics based on estimation sample: all
male individuals working between 1992 and 1996.
43
Table 6: Worker types distribution by owner’s skill requirement
Low-Skill Industries High-Skill Industries
Worker / Owner Immigrant Native Mixed All Immigrant Native Mixed All
Immigrant 38.60 11.60 27.50 15.40 33.70 9.20 41.60 11.50
Native 61.40 88.40 72.50 84.60 66.30 90.80 58.40 88.50
Race/ethnicity
Hispanic* 19.23 10.12 16.78 11.40 17.73 6.44 20.05 7.43
Asian 18.22 2.63 8.23 4.64 17.09 2.97 24.30 4.34
Black 5.38 6.83 7.62 6.68 6.45 10.84 4.45 10.42
White (non-hispanic) 48.71 76.18 61.38 72.47 52.22 75.49 42.07 73.28
Other** 8.46 4.25 5.98 4.80 6.51 4.27 9.12 4.53
All 70.83 54.16 62.24 100.00 29.17 45.84 37.76 100.00
Note: Using Census 1990 information on workers’ education attainment by industry, industries are separated into
High Skill and Low Skill. High skill refers to those industries in which more than 50% of workers have at least a
high school diploma. Otherwise we define the industry as low skill. (*) Hispanic refers to all races with ethnic group
Hispanic. (**) The group Other includes Native American and otherwise unclassified racial groups.
Native-American workers represented only 0.5% of the total sample.
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Table 7: Linear Estimates of the Effect of Owner Type on the Probability that a New Hire is an Immigrant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) FE
Owner Mix -0.0374*** -0.0519*** -0.041*** -.0034** -0.0037** -0.00313**
0.0056 0.0057 0.0065 0.001 0.001 0.001
Owner Native -0.2539*** -0.2358*** -0.0351*** 0.0342*** -0.033*** -0.0254***
0.003 0.0032 0.0031 0.0009 0.0004 0.0014
Share of Immigrant Coworkers 0.9961*** 0.782*** 0.7724*** 0.7132*** 0.6715***
when hired 0.0056 0.002 0.0101 0.0234 0.0435
Share of Coworkers when hired -0.0125** -0.0094**
* Owner Mix 0.005 0.005
Share of Coworkers when hired -0.0711*** -0.0378***







Share of workers with HSD (firm) 0.0021**
0.0004
Share of workers with HSG (firm) -0.0012
0.001
Share of workers with SCG (firm) 0.005
0.006
Population % immigrant in neighborhood(+) 0.0162**
0.0068




Constant 0.3709*** 0.4081*** 0.0211*** 0.0989*** 0.0969*** 0.0285** 0.1575*
0.0032 0.099 0.0039 0.002 0.0016 0.0069 0.781
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies - yes yes yes yes yes -
Industry*English speaker dummy - - - yes yes yes -
R-Square 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.41
Note: Reference group is immigrant firms.Reference Sector is Services. The number of observations is 147,373. Standard Errors are
Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for firm clustering. (+) Neighborhood is defined counties adjacent to the county
where the firm is located. Population in 100,000’s. FE represents the firm fixed-effect model. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: Multinomial Logit Model: Effects of Owner Type and Coworkers on Type of New Hires
Change in log odds comparing alternative 1 to alternative 2
coworker White to Black White to Asian White to Hispanic Black to Hispanic Black to Asian Asian to Hispanic
White -1.97*** 2.32*** 3.53*** 1.44* 0.53 0.92
0.646 0.761 0.421 0.71 0.723 1.017
Black -5.352*** 1.186 2.145*** 7.456*** 5.456*** 1.014
0.892 1.086 0.661 0.957 0.968 1.131
Asian -1.391 -7.243*** 0.041 1.433 -5.682*** 7.126***
0.951 1.001 0.591 1.108 0.946 1.143
Hispanic -0.236 -0.086 -3.675*** -3.127*** 0.15 -3.654***
1.03 1.102 0.527 1.09 0.952 1.361
Notes: Notes: Other controls include log of employment, percentage of immigrant workers in the surrounding counties,
population in the county, legal form of organization, Msa location, 2-digit industry, interaction 2-digit industry and English
speaker dummy, state and year dummies. Results from race/ethnicity ’others’ are not shown. Number of observation 135,583
workers, and 2,662 firms. Robust standard errors in italic allow for arbitrary correlation within the same firm. * significant at
10%,** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 11: Multinomial Logit Model: Predicted Probability of Covariates
Workers
Owner White Black Asian Hispanic
Native 0.740 0.120 0.031 0.100
Immigrant 0.710 0.102 0.060 0.126
Mix 0.690 0.119 0.052 0.134
Note: Based on multinomial logit predictions of the race of new hires from previous table.
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Table 12: OLS Results: Effect of Owner Type and Coworker Share on Log Real Annual Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Immigrant -0.08*** -0.1503*** -0.1205*** -0.1171*** -0.1017***
0.007 0.0069 0.0073 0.0025 0.0008
Age 0.0806*** 0.080*** 0.0803*** 0.0802*** 0.0749***
0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0008
Age square (’) -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.080***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Education 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.511*** 0.504*** 0.484***
0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Partime -2.1847*** -2.1805*** -2.1792*** -2.1783*** -2.1240***
0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0036 0.0049
Owner Mix 0.1808*** 0.1615*** 0.1407*** 0.0936
0.0128 0.013 0.0481 0.0155
Owner Immigrant -0.1191*** -0.1443*** -0.1495*** -0.1087***
0.0097 0.0101 0.017 0.012
Owner Mix*Immigrant 0.0054 -0.0007 0.1866 0.1368
0.0224 0.02 0.251 0.243
Owner Immigrant*Immigrant 0.3205*** 0.3030*** 0.3174*** 0.3131***
0.0251 0.0153 0.017 0.0252
Imm.Coworker -0.1398*** -0.2457*** -0.3797***
0.0163 0.0203 0.0276










Constant 10.665*** 10.7015*** 10.686*** 10.653*** 10.615***
0.26 0.262 0.263 0.241 0.235
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
2-digit industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls no no no no yes
R-Square Adjusted 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.35
Note: The number of observations includes 214,398 workers. Standard Errors are Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected by
firm clustering. Reference group are full time native workers in native firms. (+) Neighborhood is defined as the contiguous
counties to the county where the firm is located. Population in 100,000’s. (’) Age ∗ 102.
***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Figure 1: Workforce Characteristics of Immigrant, Mix and Native Firms
Note: Weighted share and percentage. Base on years 1992-1996.
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Figure 2: Workforce Characteristics of Immigrant, Mix and Native Firms Cont...




To have an idea of the groups of firms included in both database, I include a short discussion on firms
matching rate. Mostly, matches between CBO and SSEL in 1992 are employer firms (See Table(A-1)).
However, there is a small portion of non-employers that match with SSEL48. The matching rate, although
very high, is not 100%. There is a group of industries that are not included in SSEL such as Private
Households (88), and Direct Sellers (5963) that are included in the CBO. The matching rate increases with
the number of owners of the firm. Number of owners in the firm and size of the firm are also relatively
proportional.













Source: Authors calculation based on CBO(1992) and SSEL(1992).
B Definitions
Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL).
• Sales: Following Spletzer [1998], I consider the variable sales as to the sum over ACSR1, ACSR2,
ACSR3. We can include ACSR4 for Corporations and Partnerships. Spletzer [1998] gives a more
detailed information on the sale data in the SSEL. For single establishment file has sales data. This
variable contains data for the Value of Shipments, Sales, Receipts, or Revenue. It may include ’‘to-
tal revenues, gross income, operating receipts (gross receipts or sales less returns and allowances),
interest income, and gross rents”. In 1992, 80.1 percent of SSEL single establishments have current
year sales data. When matched with CBO we obtain sales data for all firms. Spletzer [1998] com-
pared the values for Employment, Payroll, and Sales between SSEL and the Economic Census. He
found that, for 1992 and single establishments in Maryland, the number for the two first match well.
However, the numbers for sales and sales per worker shows a difference above 8%. He speculates
that the difference is coming from distint definitions, specifically for commissions for wholesalers
‘’that sell as an agent for another company (Type of Operation code=43 or 46).”
• For the employment variable I use the sum of ACEMP and AC943E.
C Unknown-Owned Firms
Before continuing with the analysis, it is worthy of attention to mention that there exists a group of un-
defined firms for which owners’ nativity is unknown. Mostly, this group corresponds to firms that did
not answer the survey (CBO). 95% of the owners of these firms did not answer the survey. I obtained
48The SSEL in 1992 seems to include those nonemployer firms that were subject to Federal Income Tax49.
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information on their distribution, size, sales and payroll using SSEL and EC in 1992. At a glance, from
Table( 1) the distribution of this type of firms across size and sectors is similar to the rest of the group.
For further analysis, I compute a t-test of equality of productivity proxies and earnings per employees
means between the unknown-owned firms and a weighted average value of the productivity proxies and
earnings of the other three groups. A t-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mean of labor pro-
ductivity (t-test=-0.89), and logarithm of earnings per employee (t-test=2.2) of unknown-owned firms and
the rest of the groups are the same at the 90% level. The average number of owners and the average share
immigrant workers at the firm is also similar when we compare unknown-owned firms with the average
of immigrant, mix and native-owned firms.
Additionally, a chi-square test over unknown-owner firms’ and the rest of the group’s distribution
across categories (size and sector) cannot reject the hypothesis that unknown-owned firms and the total
of firms excluding unknowns are similarly distributed across the categories size and sector presented
in Table( 1) at the 90% level. The Pearson chi-square for the size distribution is 9.02 (Pr=0.11). For the
distribution across sectors, the Pearson chi-square with 6 degree of freedom is equal to 16.02 (Pr=0.08).
Like the other firms types, unknown-owned firms are highly represented in Wholesale, Manufacturing,
Services and Retail. At the same time, more than 70% of unknown-nativity employers are businesses with
less than 20 employees.
It is very relevant for us to know whether the owner (or owners) of the firm was (were) born in the
USA or otherwise. We cannot identify this profile for the group unknown. Given that the characteristics of
the unknown group are very similar, in average, to rest of the sample, I decide to drop these observations.
For the rest of the paper, we only consider those groups for which nativity is obtained (three groups of
firms: native-owned, mix-owned, and immigrant-owned).
D Weights and selection
According to Heckman(1979), I obtain the probit estimate from the probit selection equation in order to
estimate the inverse mills ratio. The probability of being a matched firm in the sample is estimated as a
function of the characteristics of the firm: size, industry, legal form of organization, geographic location,





where Φ(.) is the standard normal cfd, φ(.) is the standard normal density and z is x
′
β/σ. The covariates
x are the ones discussed above and the coefficients are estimates of the probit model.
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